pickett v british rail engineering
The one has no relation to the other.If the damages claimed remained, nominally, the same, because there wasno inflation, interest would normally be given. The answer is I suppose that being dead he has noliving expenses. (2d) 195. They claimed compensation under the Act. Icannot agree with that conclusion. The appellant now appeals to this House contending that a much largeramount ought to have been awarded in respect of loss of future earnings.She also claims that interest should be awarded on the general damages.The respondent appeals against the award of 10,000 general damages. Was he intending to lay down a principle " in" clear and careful terms " of general application? Such losses are recoverable in adult claims on the basis that that person has been deprived the opportunity to use their income in the way . Mr. Pickett, who was the plaintiff in the action, claimed damages fromthe defendants, British Rail Engineering Ltd., his employers, for seriouspersonal injury sustained in the course of his employment. Hethought it flowed from that principle " that anything having a money value" which the plaintiff has lost should be made good in money." Principle would appear, therefore, to suggest that a plaintiff ought to beentitled to damages for the loss of earnings he could have reasonablyexpected to have earned during the "lost years". I shall deal briefly with the other issues. Cited Murray v Shuter CA 1972 The plaintiff had been badly injured and was not expected to live long. It is said that it is not clear whether Greer L.J. Brett and Cotton L.JJ. It is the loss which is sufferedby being kept out of money to which one is entitled. He maywish to benefit some dependants more than, or to the exclusion of,othersthis (subject to family inheritance legislation) he is entitled to do.He may not have dependants, but he may have others, or causes, whomhe would wish to benefit, for whom he might even regard himself asworking. . It is not" enough that there is a balance of opinion or preference. A full list of legal databases can be found by title and all databases available at Oxford can be found on Databases A . I note the reference at page 571(b) to the guidance of Lord Salmon in the House of Lords case of Pickett v British Rail Engineering Limited [1980] AC 136 @ 153-154: "Damages for the loss of earnings during the lost years should be assessed justly and On the other hand, Slesser L.J. ), the plaintiff died after trial but before the decision had been rendered . Secondly, even if he has dependants,he may have chosen to make a will depriving them of support from hisestate. There will remain some difficulties. There canbe no question of these damages being fixed at any conventional figurebecause damages for pecuniary loss, unlike damages for pain and suffering,can be naturally measured in money. Such is the general. swarb.co.uk is published by David Swarbrick of 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire, HD6 2AG. which led to its rejection by the House of Lords in 1980 in Pickett v. British Rail Engineering Ltd.2 was produced by its interaction with the assumed rule that if an injured plaintiff brought a . the 'full compensation' concept was established in the 19 th century and endorsed by Lord Scarman in Pickett v British Rail Engineering (1980). The Law Library subscribes to all the major legal databases required to assist in legal research, teaching and learning. I would, therefore,allow the cross-appeal and restore the judge's award of 7,000 generaldamages. The determination of the quantum must answer what contemporary society "would deem to be a fair sum . The wrongdoer cannot be called upon to make a double payment to or to suffer a double recovery by the plaintiff: see the speeches in the case of Pickett v British Rail Engineering (2). As a result of the defendant's negligence, he has contracted adisease or suffered injuries which cut down his expectation of life to, say,five years and prevent him from earning any remuneration during thatperiod. Manage Settings 805, C.A.and Murray v. Shuter [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 6 at p.7. I recognise that there is a comparatively small minority of cases in whicha man whose life, and therefore his capacity to earn, is cut short, diesintestate with no dependants or has made a will excluding dependants,leaving all his money to others or to charity. Suppose him to belife tenant of substantial settled funds. Followed Skelton v Collins 7-Mar-1966 (High Court of Australia) Damages Personal Injuries Loss of earning capacity Loss of expectation of life Loss of amenities during reduced life span Pain and suffering Plaintiff rendered permanently unconscious by injuries Basis of . We should not, I think, follow the English decisions in which" in assessing the loss of earnings the ' lost years' are not taken into" account.". But a programme of constant improvements saw it become increasingly competitive towards the end of its lfe. . when an infant is killed outright. The plaintiff could, if" he had not been injured, have sold his labour and his skill or the" fruits of his labour and his skill. No. nursing care, shopping, gardening if caused by D's negligence. A claim for loss of expectation of life survived under the Act of 1934, and was not a claim for damages based on the death of a person and so barred at common law.Lord Wright . In Oliver v Ashman [1962] 2 QB 210 a boy of twenty months was so seriously injured in a motor accident that he became mentally defective and incapable of any . But itwould be bad law if this element of non-pecuniary damage should be usedto make good in whole or in part the loss of earnings during the " lost" years ", which under the law as it stood when this case was before theCourt of Appeal were not recoverable as damages. The House of Lords in Pickett v. British Rail Engineering [1980 . But it has beensubmitted by the respondents that such a rule, if it be thought sociallydesirable, requires to be implemented by legislation. . . The Master of the Rolls, " Although I well appreciate the care which the judge gave to this" case, it seems to me that there is one feature which the judge did" not take into account sufficiently, and that is the distress which" Mr. Pickett must have suffered knowing that his widow and" dependants would be left without him to care for them. Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, pro-vides that the court shall (my emphasis) exercise its power to award intereston damages, or on such part of the damages as the court considers appro-priate, " unless the court is satisfied that there are special reasons why no" interest should be given in respect of those damages." To the argument that " they are of no value because you will not" be there to enjoy them " can he not reply, " yes they are: what is of" value to me is not only my opportunity to spend them enjoyably, but to" use such part of them as I do not need for my dependants, or for other" persons or causes which I wish to support. On the other view, he has, in" addition to losing a prospect of the years of life, lost the income" that he would have earned, and the profits that would have been" his had he lived.". If you would like to change your settings or withdraw consent at any time, the link to do so is in our privacy policy accessible from our home page.. 222;Harris v. Brights Asphalt Contracors Ltd. [1953] 1 Q.B. But for his injury, Mr. Pickett could have expectedto work until normal retiring age (i.e. Greve L, Pickett AK. .Applied Gammell v Wilson; Furness v Massey HL 1982 In each case, the deceased, died as a result of the defendants negligence. The Defendant relied upon the decision in the case of Adsett v West [1983] QB 826 in support of its argument. agreed with that judgment. Associate Dean, sociologist, medical historian, and scholar of feminist science and technology studies. But the claim there being considered was what sum should be awarded tothe estate of a child of two and half years who died the day after he wasinjured. He is no longer there to earn them, since he" has died before they could be earned. We are not directly concerned on that question with either the LawReform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, or the Fatal Accidents Acts.The deceased plaintiff survived to trial and judgment: the appeal is by hispersonal representative as representing his estate and does not need the 1934Act to support it, the cause of action having merged in the judgment. Secondly, as thereporter mentions in a parenthesis ([1941] A.C. 159) mention was madein argument of the recent Court of Appeal case of Roach v. Yates [19381]1 K.B. I may say at once that I do not regard what was said in Benham v.Gambling in this House as throwing any light on this problem. The law is not concerned with how a plaintiff spends the damages awardedto him. In England, rates of interest at nine per cent or ten per cent have been applied in cases such as Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd. (14) and Lim Poh Choo (4). 94in which the High Court of Australia, refusing to follow Oliver v. Ashman,achieved the same result. The policy of the Acts was, in my opinion, clearly to put thatman's dependants, as far as possible, in the same financial position as theywould have been in if the bread-winner had lived long enough to obtainjudgment against the tortfeasor. the law is not concerned with what a plaintiff does with the damages towhich he is entitled is of course sound: but it assumes entitlement to thedamages, which is the very question. 78, Roachv. I cannot see that damages that flow" from the destruction or diminution of his capacity to do so are any" the less when the period during which the capacity might have been" exercised is curtailed because the tort cut short his expected span" of life.". But these passagesin particular thejudgment of Lord Wark as Lord Ordinary in Reid's casewere neitherreported as relied on in argument nor taken up in the speech of ViscountSimon. The issue between the parties is as to the amount ofdamages which the judge at trial ought to have awarded Mr. Pickett, aliving plaintiff. As Viscount Simon himselfacknowledged, the only issue with which the House was then concernedwas the assessment of damages for loss of expectation of life. See solutions on page 215 of your study guide (self . This calculation, too, is by no means free fromdifficulty, but a similar task has to be performed regularly in cases broughtunder the Fatal Accidents Act. Compare him with a manin poor health and out of a job, is he not, and not only in the immediatepresent, a richer man? 65) and to enjoy thereafter a periodof retirement. He has merely lost the prospect" of some years of life which is a complex of pleasure and pain, of" good and ill, of profits and losses. But if there is a choice between taking a viewof the law which mitigates a clear and recognised injustice in cases of normaloccurrence, at the cost of the possibility in fewer cases of excess paymentsbeing made, or leaving the law as it is, I think that our duty is clear. I do not accept the suggestion that Parliament in enactingthe Fatal Accidents Acts must have assumed a live plaintiff's claim for the, It has, my Lords, correctly been remarked that though in the instant casethe plaintiff had dependants who (it was assumed) were barred from aFatal Accidents Act claim by the judgment, the question of the lost yearsmust be answered in the same way in a case of a plaintiff without dependants.But the solution proposed, involving as it does deduction from lost years'earnings of the plaintiff's living expenses, appears to me to attempt to splicetwo quite separate types of claim: a claim by dependants for dependencyand a claim by the plaintiff himself. . The doctor failed to diagnose cancer. The decision of this House in Benham v. Gamblin [1941] A.C. 157that damages for loss of expectation of life could only be given up to aconventional figure, then fixed at 200. I do not think that the problem can be solved by describing what hasbeen lost as an " opportunity " or a " prospect" or an " expectation ".Indeed these words are invoked both waysby the Lords Justices as denyinga right to recover (on grounds of remoteness, intangibility or speculation),by those supporting the appellant's argument as demonstrating the lossof some real asset of true value. Holroyd Pearce L.J. The judgments, further,bring out an important ingredient, which I would accept, namely that theamount to be recovered in respect of earnings in the " lost" years should beafter deduction of an estimated sum to represent the victim's probable livingexpenses during those years. Generally, the amount recoverable may be limited where, for instance, the deceased's character or habits were calculated to . He is no longer there to earn them, since he has" died before they could be earned. And what is lost is an" expectation, not the thing itself. In theory, therefore, and to some extent in practice, inflation is takencare of by increasing the number of money units in the award so that thereal value of the loss is met. Photo Illustration by Erin O'Flynn/The Daily Beast/Getty Images. Subject to the family inheri-tance legislation, a man may do what he likes with his own. Indeed, anything elsewould be inconsistent with the general rule which Lord Blackburn hasformulated in these words: -. The Courtof Appeal increased the award of general damages to 10,000; but refusedto allow interest upon this award. we said that, in personal injury cases, when a lump sum is awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenities, interest should run from the date of service of the writ to the date of trial. agreed with both judgments, and it is difficult to regardas other than accurate the headnote which attributes to all three membersof the Court the view expressed by Slesser L.J. The plaintiff was ayoung boy who, when 20 months old, had suffered injuries as a result ofthe defendant's negligence which turned him into a low grade mentaldefective and reduced his expectation of life from 60 years to 30 years.He claimed damages not only for loss of expectation of life, pain, suffering,loss of amenities and the expenses incurred in taking care of him, but alsofor the loss of what he might have earned but for the accident. My Lords, I have reached the conclusion which I would recommend sofar without reference to the case of Skelton v. Collins (1966) 115 C.L.R. expressed the view that Oliver v. Ashman (ante)" does seem to work a grave injustice ", and I regard it as wronglydecided. 230): " When the [variegated tapestry of life] is severed there is but one" sum recoverable in respect of that severance. He was unconscious from the moment of the accident until his death, which occurred later on the same day. He was a champion cyclist ofOlympic standard, he kept himself very fit and was a non-smoker. Cited Williams v Mersey Docks and Harbour Board CA 1905 The deceased suffered an injury in December 1902 which would have entitled him to institute proceedings against the harbour board within the special statutory period of six months pursuant to the 1893 Act. said in Phillipsv. It may be that he will" become aware of the position so far as the future is concerned." Defendants' representatives often cite the Court of Appeal decision in Mills v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1992] PIQR 130 as authority for the proposition that damages for gratuitous care should . Subjective, so victim must be aware of it (Wise v Kaye) Loss of Amenity: objective (West v Shephard). 774 (H.L.)) Professor of Law. Get 1 point on adding a valid citation to this judgment. Get 1 point on providing a valid sentiment to this In most cases of this kind, the plaintiff, whether or not he knows he islikely to die as a result of the defendant's negligence, will bring his case tocourt or settle it as soon as possible because he is in urgent need of thatpart of the damages to which he is entitled, so that he may support himselfand his family during his life. What is suggested is that hecommitted errors (a) by failing to take sufficiently into account the distresscaused to Mr. Pickett by the realisation " that his dependants would be left" without him to care for them "; and (b) by starting at too low a figure andthen failing to allow sufficiently for inflation. There is the additional merit of bringing awards under this head into line with what could be recovered under the Fatal Accidents Acts.. The problem has, as your Lordships have pointed but, beentouched upon in a number of cases, but its solution is at large for this House. Cunningham v HarrisonUNK [1973] 3 All ER 463 Kelland v Lamer 1987 Civil Jur. He has merely lost the" prospect of some years of life which is a complex of pleasure and" pain, of good and ill, of profits and losses. Your Lordships' House is, however, concerned with the principle of thematter. However, not only is it possible at law to recover losses during a period when the claimant is no longer living (see e.g. There can be no doubt that but for hisexposure to asbestos dust in his employment he could have looked forwardto a normal period of continued employment up to retiring age. Inflationis an economic and financial condition of general application in our society.Its impact upon this plaintiff has been neither more nor less than uponeverybody else: there is nothing special about it. after a widercitation of authorities, said (p.245): " In my view the conclusion, shortly stated, is that the conventional" sum in the region of 200 which is to be awarded for loss of expectation" of life should be regarded as covering all the elements of ite.g.," joys and sorrows, work and leisure, earnings and spending or saving" money, marriage and parenthood and providing for dependantsand" should be regarded as excluding any additional assessment for any of" those elements. I have stated the problem without confining it to earnings in the lost years.Suppose a plaintiff injured tortiously in a motoring accident, aged 25 at trial,with a resultant life expectation then of only one year. Held: The widow could not bring an action for loss of dependency under section 1 of the 1846 Act.
